

HIJRAH PHENOMENON AMONG INDONESIAN MUSLIM MIDDLE CLASS: CURRENT CAUSES & CHALLENGES

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Abstract

The word "hijrah" has been familiar among the Indonesian middle class recently. Hijrah refers to the re-adaptation of religious values in daily life, especially for individual Muslims. This attitude responds to various issues such as life crises, mental health issues, anxiety, and increasing religious teaching demands. Therefore, committing to religious values would be the main answer to every problem. Recently, hijrah has not merely been a personal matter, but it has been a collective norm that bound Muslims, especially young people. As a communal norm, the hijrah intention has responded to broad issues. Most importantly, hijrah has become an identity symbol rather than a spiritual motive. Eventually, it might be a critical point to examine the hijrah phenomenon among the Muslim middle class. Following up on these gaps, this research would like to investigate the recent shift of the hijrah movement that affected the Muslim middle class. The research method is a critical literature review. This research shows that committing to hijrah is a way to not only strengthen piousness but also to bring Islam fits in with modernism. This has implications for the way of religious expression in public spaces.

Keywords: *hijrah, Indonesian Muslim middle class, religious expression, piousness*

INTRODUCTION

The word "hijrah" has become the primary definition in understanding the rise of personal faith and piety quality. It can be seen from the intensity of public activity, especially from the upper middle class, to understand and deepen religious teachings concerning God through various kinds of public recitations, *halaqahs*, and online teaching sessions. In this regard, *hijrah* is an effort to make an individual better than the previous one. Indeed, "better" can be very subjective and personal. The process of *hijrah* ultimately leads to two forms, namely self-actualization as a real Muslim and self-actualization as an ideal Muslim. These two narratives represent the current shift in motivation to *hijrah* namely the political polarization factor as well as the internal rivalry factor among Islamic groups. The first factor is more closely to the narrative of Muslims/non-Muslims. This enabled *hijrah* which is interpreted as self-identification as a

Muslim (W. Jati, 2017). The second factor shows more on the contestation of theological narratives within several Islamic groups where *hijrah* attempts to establish a figure as an ideal Muslim following religious demands. This recent shift trend has made the Muslim middle class to be the leading actor in this *hijrah*.

Most previous research focused on *hijrah* as part of the recent Islamism wave in Indonesia. Especially for the young Muslim middle class, *hijrah* expresses personal piety (Farchan & Rosharlianti, 2021; Saputra et al., 2021; Sunesti et al., 2018). Meanwhile, for the senior generation, *hijrah* expresses re-Islamic morality adherences (Abdullah & Mohamed Osman, 2018; Syuhudi, 2019; Imelda & Perdana, 2023). Regarding the number of existing previous studies, one criticism that should be addressed is most studies partially capture *hijrah* as a socio-religious phenomenon and as a whole picture. This paper wants to revise how the current studies deal with this topic. It would bring significant implications on how scholars should have

helicopter views on specific topics, including plus and minus perspectives. More importantly, it would like to impact how *hijrah* is not merely a personal religious expression but also a social acceptance way in public space.

In line with the above arguments, the shift has moved the *hijrah* understanding to more social labeling. It is a way to strengthen the stigma of a Muslim as a political identity. This labeling is also part of a cultural commodity where the practice of *hijrah* has now been packaged as a form of product. This is a way to attract Muslim customers' behavior towards something labeled religious. These two factors arguably are capable of attracting the interest of the Muslim middle class to *hijrah*. Following up *hijrah* as a political identity, these are ways to raise Islamic politics in Indonesia. This condition encourages various Islamic expressions to be accommodated in the social and political system. This social implication eventually makes *hijrah* gradually accepted as a social norm. As for *hijrah* as a cultural commodity, this attitude also refers to the growing demands of various market products. This is related to the religious needs of the Muslim middle class to be able to maintain and improve the quality of their piousness. Therefore, various products on behalf of Sharia and halal were then mushroomed to support *hijrah* activities for the Muslim middle class. The existence of labeling as a true Muslim in the practice of *hijrah* encourages the middle class to transform. The presence of a robust Islamic orientation coupled with the strong spirit of consumerism makes *hijrah* seem to be a kind of new lifestyle pattern rather than a life choice. The consequences of this life choice certainly impact the strengthening of religious considerations in life decision-making.

Religious society certainly has an impact on social interaction in society. This underlies the study findings that *hijrah* is often based on external factors. For example, wearing headscarf and wider clothes for women and keeping a beard for men are small examples of people committed to *hijrah* because they show an expression of personal spiritualism. This behavior is mainly carried out by the Muslim middle class, an established and educated group of people who try to fulfill their spiritual aspects when their material aspects are fulfilled. Nonetheless, the meaning

and experience of *hijrah* among the Muslim middle class then experienced much debate (Fealy & Bush, 2014; White et al., 2008). The main point being debated is that a person's motives and background for wanting to emigrate are not entirely due to a pure conscience and religious call. Several reasons are essential indicators, for example, the search for recognition, the spiritualism factor, the friendship factor, and perhaps the social climbing factor which is the reason why people want to emigrate. However, behind the various reasons for *hijrah*, the tendency or urge to emigrate sometimes does not start from oneself but rather social factors, such as social interactions and the influence of socialites.

Various kinds of literature studies state that the process of *hijrah* among the Muslim middle class itself tends to be elitist. This shows that the essence of the *hijrah* agenda is neither inclusive nor exclusive. As mentioned, external factors influence people's decisions to emigrate rather than personal ones. One important thing that underlies the motivation to emigrate is religious celebrity. This factor refers to several Indonesian celebrities who choose *hijrah* as a new life choice. The Muslim middle-class group followed suit with *hijrah*. In this context, it can be seen that the phenomenon of *hijrah* for the Muslim middle class is driven more by external factors such as the strengthening of Islamization and identity politics, religious endorsements from religious celebrities, as well as political factors. This is in stark contrast to the original meaning of *hijrah*, which is due to an internal urge to change.

Etymologically, *hijrah* means "move". This refers to the migration experience by the Prophet Muhammad and his companions from Mecca to Medina at night (Hamudy & Hamudy, 2020). Historically, the Prophet and his companions hid in the Tsur Cave to escape the pursuit of the Quraysh tribe members and then continued their journey back to Medina. Theologically, the meaning of *hijrah* as "move" has various kinds of multi-interpretation in the text of the Qur'an, for example QS al-Ankabut (29:26) which explains returning to the bosom of God as the best place to return and move, QS al-Muzammil (73:10), namely leaving those who are reprehensible in a good way, and QS al-Muddatstsir (74:5), namely leaving disobedience and evil (Abbas & Qudsy, 2019).

Thus, based on various previous explanations, *hijrah* is ideally interpreted as an individual's spiritual journey/improvement that is carried out secretly to become a better human being both religiously and socially.

Referring to the previous definition of *hijrah*, the practice offered in this paper emphasizes two aspects, namely 1) *hijrah* as a form of self-introspection from the spiritual side of the person, which is reflective and contemplative. The point is that the practice of *hijrah* is ideally more internal than external. That is, there is no need to seek social recognition to be judged and labeled as a good person or a pious person. 2) *Hijrah* as a form of effort to balance worldly and *ukhrawi* needs by reorienting life goals that previously only focused on the worldly needs. The point is that *hijrah* is an effort to find a middle point in life goals by not having to change 180 degrees to become a religious individual. From both empirical sides regarding this *hijrah*, the correlation will be seen with the re-emergence of the Indonesian Muslim middle class after this reform (W. R. Jati, 2017; Savirani, 2020; Utomo et al., 2018).

The reappearance of the contemporary Indonesian Muslim middle class also marks a shift in the position of Islam in Indonesia. Previously, in the early to mid-20th century, Islam developed into political Islam, whose goal was to gain access to power (W. R. Jati, 2017). However, it shifted to Islamization, which developed as a civil religion where its values and teachings were considered as widely accepted social norms. This has resulted in the demand to be pious to become the mainstream in today's Indonesian society. More specifically, mainstreaming Islam as the dominant discourse has been institutionalized in various forms of life. This condition then ultimately puts the position of the Muslim middle class, which is demographically dominated by millennials and Generation Z, in a confused position in religion.

Literature Review

There are at least two exciting survey findings to capture religious turmoil, from the PPIM UIN Jakarta Survey and the Indonesian Political Indicator Survey. In the first survey, young people with middle-class Muslim backgrounds tend to be intolerant of Islamic views that are different from the views of Islam that they previously believed in (Syafuddin &

Ropi, 2018). This happened because the Islamic teachings they got were obtained from online content rather than taught through Islamic boarding schools. These conditions then sometimes create misinformation about Islam, which results in intolerant and exclusive behavior/views (W. Jati, 2023). In the second survey, young people with middle-class Muslim backgrounds also tend to be confused about the perception that Islamic Sharia must govern Indonesia and that Islam, as the majority religion, must receive privileges (Indikator Politik Indonesia, 2021). This turmoil is based on the strength of religion as the primary reference in making decisions in life. Concerning the two survey results above, the meaning and practice of *hijrah* for the Indonesian Muslim middle class are more dominated by encouragement for internal solidarity based on shared views about Islam as well as early Islamist motives, after Islamic values have been widely accepted. Then, the next step is to try to continue them in the political realm. In other words, *hijrah* can be interpreted as an expression of religious exclusivity and a means of socialization for the Indonesian Muslim middle class so that they are no longer confused when interacting (Dick, 1985; W. Jati, 2017; W. R. Jati, 2017).

Various recent studies on the phenomenon of *hijrah* among the Indonesian Muslim middle class show at least two previous patterns. The first study group that focuses on *hijrah* as a recognition tool for the Indonesian Muslim middle class is illustrated by the findings from Sunesti and the team and Farchan and Rosharlianti. The exciting point from the first study is the critical role of the actual Salafi-style Islamic concept (*kaffah*), which is used to attract the attention of the Muslim middle class to become the saved ones in this world and the hereafter (Sunesti et al., 2018). Furthermore, this motive offers *hijrah* by making social boundaries with non-migrants and those who emigrate. This perception actually took inspiration when the Prophet Muhammad was hidden in a cave when he was chased and surrounded by the Quraysh tribe when he emigrated. However, the *hijrah* of the Prophet did not become exclusive, while the *hijrah* of the Salafi style attempted to create social boundaries. The second finding from Farchan and Rosharlianti found that the exclusive side of religion in terms of *hijrah* is reflected in the strengthening

power of consumption of goods/services labeled as Muslim to strengthen the image of *hijrah* in the public sphere (Farchan & Rosharlianti, 2021). Thus, from the perspective of religious exclusivity, *hijrah* creates a "new society" within the existing social system by creating and consuming its goods/services.

The second perspective, as an event for socialization, *hijrah* is a means of social climbing for the Muslim middle class. Two recent studies that capture this are mainly from Annisa and Hamudy. The first study looks at individual motives for *hijrah* because they are pursuing positions as micro-celebrities in society by trying to make themselves part of Muslim icons through narratives of social media content (Annisa, 2018). The motive for becoming micro-celebrities certainly has something to do with the Islamization that is prevalent in society, so *hijrah* actors want to get a position in that stream. In line with Annisa, Hamudy's study also sees that *hijrah* behavior is driven more by digital spiritualism, the influence of public figures who "migrate" by highlighting the pious sides, for example, wearing a wider headscarf for women, keeping beards for men, as well as using Arabic language diction in popular conversation (Hamudy & Hamudy, 2020). In addition, *hijrah* as a social movement is also interpreted as an expression of instant and communal piety where individuals and collectives who emigrate are more inclined because they do not want to be left behind by social trends that are developing, especially from the media. This then creates the label and stigma of *hijrah* and non-*hijrah*, where those who *hijrah* are more widely accepted in the public sphere because of the construction of pious in the public eyes.

Thus, the phenomenon of *hijrah* among the Muslim middle class is more driven to seek existence rather than to deepen the substance of religion spiritually. This is, of course, in contrast, and found no correlation with the spirit of *hijrah* of the Prophet Muhammad SAW or the texts in the Qur'an. The two sources see *hijrah* as "a process of moving, but it does not have to be exclusive and the center of attention". This is because *hijrah* is more inclined to self-introspection to be better than seeking recognition to be considered reasonable. Of course, by returning to a comprehensive and contextual interpretation of *hijrah*, the Muslim middle

class should not become instant Muslims who feel they have become real Muslims (*kaffah*) by feeling themselves special (Kuntowidjojo, 1986).

Conceptual Framework

This study uses *hijrah* as the central unit of theoretical analysis in this research. It draws comparative literature on previous and current studies in understanding the development of *hijrah* from time to time. More importantly, it will bring us to more deeply the shift of the *hijrah* attitude among Indonesian Muslim middle classes.

The journey to *hijrah* has various social stages that must be analyzed. This is because the meaning of *hijrah* has various interpretations for the Muslim middle class. As previously described, religious reasons by identifying oneself as a righteous Muslim and pragmatic reason, namely social climbing, are part of the goals why people migrate. However, more than that, it is necessary to analyze the factors and reasons behind the journey toward the *hijrah*.

The classic study on the phenomenon of *hijrah* which marks the transformation of the urban middle class into the Muslim middle class, begins with Kuntowidjojo. Through a study entitled "Muslims without Mosques", Kuntowidjojo describes a new generation of Indonesian Muslims who obtain Islamic teachings not through conventional institutions such as Islamic boarding schools, mosques, and recitations but through digital channels, particularly video streaming. This new generation of Indonesian Muslims then, in the end, only studied Islam partially. This is because Islamic teachings accepted by the Muslim middle class do not go through the traditional process of transferring Islamic knowledge. Furthermore, the position of teachers and students in teaching and preaching Islam is no longer based on the depth of knowledge or *karomah*. However, now it is based on the viral content of Islamic da'wah in public spaces and the number of followers of *ustadz/ustadzah* in social media spaces. Thus, the resulting new generation of Muslims is more characterized by Islamic teachings that are solutive and practical but less down-to-earth.

Discussing the meaning of *hijrah* consists of three essential phases: cognitive opening, religious seeking, and socialization.

Quintan Wiktorowicz inspires these three phases about internalizing basic Islamic values and principles so that the person is in accordance with the Qur'an and Hadith. (Osman, 2018) Thus, *hijrah* is a form of recognition and internalization of Islamic values within oneself related to the contemplation made on the lived life experiences.

These three stages impact the Muslim middle class when they decide to emigrate. In that context, the response to *hijrah* usually starts from a kind of emptiness of life, which then encourages contemplation of life. The existence of a life orientation to pursue material and worldly aspects makes the urban middle-class turn to religion as their next life goal. This shift in the meaning of life, from material to spiritual, deserves special attention. Moreover, it is associated with the pattern of behavior of the Indonesian middle class, which seeks stability and comfort. Of course, with the inclusion of religions that emphasize doctrinal understanding "contrary" to the principles of comfort and stability.

Socio-politically, the three stages also reflect that religion will develop more and more significantly as a political preference. This is also related to the meaning of *hijrah* where religiosity will be the determining benchmark. Nonetheless, the strengthening of *hijrah* in middle-class Muslim societies has not had a symmetrical impact on the strengthening of the electability of Islamic-based political parties. The lack of synchrony between religious expression and formal political choices indicates that these *hijrah*-based political preferences lead to personal choices rather than institutional ones.

Moreover, the cognitive opening aspect includes the importance of Islam as a solution to life's problems. In this context, the Muslim middle class tries to reflect on life's problems and the solutions religion offers. It was in this process that the seeds of *hijrah* began to form within the Muslim middle class. The cognitive opening begins with introducing a spiritual approach to solving life's problems. This approach includes, for example, the midnight prayer for the smooth running of business and charity for the smooth running of affairs. These two spiritual practices are basically sunnah practices for those who are able to carry them out in Islam. However, in the cognitive opening stage, it is as if changing

what is sunnah becomes obligatory. This should be an opening door to elaborating the reasons behind the practice of *hijrah* in some middle-class Muslims who seem to be increasingly exclusive. The pattern of cognitive opening for the Muslim middle class can be made in various ways, namely 1) popular Islamic media and 2) *liqo*-based recitations. These two events are a regular pattern in recruiting the middle class to migrate to become the Muslim middle class. Firstly, popular Islamic media itself usually means online da'wah channels, which are usually carried by popular preachers or artists who have emigrated. Sharing personal experiences in obtaining guidance from celebrities is an essential step in the cognitive opening aspect. The critical dimension that is prioritized in this aspect is the changing attitudes and actions of individuals who used to be in the world of immorality, now gradually become good people by *hijrah*. This condition affects most of the Muslim middle-class groups in Indonesia. As for the second way, through *liqo*-based recitations, this comes from a door-to-door da'wah pattern that is personal. An important pull factor from this *liqo* is the influence of the closest circle, who are already members of the recitation. This chain pattern, which then grew, made this *liqo* a means of transformation for emigrating people. From these two entrances, the initial stages of the *hijrah* of the middle class to become the Muslim middle class began with the teachings of the importance of religion in life solutions.

This understanding of the importance of religion encourages the inclusion of spirituality and religiosity values in the Muslim middle-class group. What is more, the thing highlighted by the inclusion of these values is God's help, which is a plus point. In this context, transcendental structural power occurs in solving worldly problems. So then, this middle-class Muslim group found the figure of "God" in life's problems by undergoing various kinds of rituals that had been lived. These conditions make this Muslim middle-class group continue to strive to increase their level of religiosity and spirituality to overcome material problems. After going through this period of cognitive opening, the next phase is the search for religious meaning. This is compared to the first stage, where the seeds of the motivation to emigrate begin to form by reflecting. In this

second stage, the motivation of the Muslim middle class to emigrate begins to strengthen by trying to explore the meaning of religion and spirituality. In other words, in this phase, the pattern of *hijrah* from the Indonesian Muslim middle class has moved to let go of worldly dependence. The search for religiosity and spirituality can be interpreted as the practice of asceticism. However, the deepening of the meaning of religiosity and spirituality is more inclined towards efforts to build self-existence to remain consistent in the path of religion. This usually starts with changing oneself into a religious figure by changing appearance to make it look virtuous and *syar'i* and changing patterns of social interaction behavior that were previously free to prefer certain social circles. The existence of these two changes is part of an effort to focus on *hijrah* socially, preferring to be exclusive. Of course, by looking at these behaviors, religious seeking in the practice of *hijrah* among the Muslim middle class itself is in the initial personal affirmation of being *kaffah*.

Another understanding regarding religious seeking can also be intended as an effort to be a differentiator to himself before and to other people around him. *Hijrah* by deepening religious values will certainly make drastic changes for the individual himself as well as for other people. However, the perpetrators of *hijrah* want to appear as a differentiator by making religion a way of life. These conditions indirectly make *hijrah* actors continue to strive consistently to find the meaning of religiosity through sunnah and obligatory worship. By making religion a value and a way of life, those who emigrate in this second stage also try to make themselves appear adaptive in a modern way with a religious lifestyle. This second stage influences the Muslim middle-class group to synergize with modernization. This later gave rise to the term urban *santri*, where *hijrah* is a symbol of modern people looking for the meaning of religion in capitalism.

RESEARCH METHOD

This paper used library research. This method collected findings from previous research done on specific topics where findings were taken from relevant publications (George, 2008). Therefore, the library research aims to understand findings, and it attempts to look up gaps that would be new findings. This

research was undertaken following these number of steps: 1) collecting books, journals, and other relevant documents that are suitable for *hijrah* topics. Moreover, the publications should meet the academic criteria, such as peer-reviewed journals and scientific books from reputable publishers, 2) identified keywords per each publication that helps find exciting information on *hijrah*, 3) evaluated the findings of previous research by analyzing link and match between the chosen topic and the *hijrah* phenomenon. Furthermore, it enabled researchers to make critical reviews of previous findings to find their arguments as well as the conclusion; 4) the final procedure is reviewing the progress that had been underway, for example, the topic consistency during the writing processes (Onwuegbuzie & Frels, 2016).

DISCUSSION

Hijrah for Muslim Middle Class: Negotiating Modernity and Piousness

Efforts to reconcile *hijrah* and modernization were carried out in various ways. One of the latest real examples is the *hijrah* festival event and urban youth communities such as the *hijrah* youth. As for the first, the *hijrah* festival is a form of religious celebration packaged in pop culture. This is an easy and adaptive way to reach other middle-class Muslims, so they want to emigrate. Apart from that, it is also an effort so that the messages of religiosity in Islam can be digested easily. Second, the youth of *hijrah* and other *hijrah*-driving communities are part of efforts to build a positive image of youth based on religious values. Of course, when paying attention to these two aspects, the meaning that can be drawn from religious seeking is an effort to escalate Islamic religious values in a widespread and comprehensive manner.

In contrast to the cognitive opening where the desire to emigrate is only voluntary, in the religious seeking stage, there is an indication that *hijrah* can be developed into a social norm, especially about other people. That is why, in the aspect of religious seeking, Islamic values are emphasized monolithically as a form of source of truth. This is what makes the reasons in the process of religious seeking, the phenomenon of citation of various verses of the Qur'an and hadiths often appears as a basis for the *hijrah* behavior of these middle-

class Muslims in acting and arguing. Although sometimes it can meet the proper context and wrong, at least in this phase, the strengthening of middle-class Muslims to return to the Qur'an is an essential indicator in the search for this religious meaning.

After going through the two previous stages, the cognitive opening and religious seeking, the stage of *hijrah* from the Indonesian Muslim middle class reaches socialization. At this stage, the *hijrah* has entered a consolidative phase in which a commitment to move on an *istiqomah* basis has emerged. In other words, the socialization stage already shows that the Muslim middle class has completely emigrated from their previous life. The consequence of this stage is that social interaction becomes more exclusive because the perpetrators of this *hijrah* then try to create a social demarcation between those who have emigrated and those who have not emigrated. This aims to purify the desire to emigrate so that it is not contaminated with worldly desires. The existence of this social demarcation also made the *hijrah* movement, which was in the stage of socialization, change its aim from being inclusive to being more exclusive. Although this exclusive level is, of

course, different depending on the theological school adopted by the middle Muslim.

The differences in the stages of socialization according to the school's lines ultimately determine the depth of the level of understanding of religion and how it is applied in social interaction. Having a more closed appearance has become the leading standard in this stage of *hijrah* for Muslim men and women. More than that, *hijrah* experiences branching of aims and objectives following the principles adhered to. This is what causes the final pattern of middle-class *hijrah* to experience various forms of ramifications and goals. Some strictly refer to Arabic as the primary model, giving rise to the trend of Arabization in the trend of *hijrah* in Indonesia. Some adapt to modern styles with the *syar'i* corridor. The last model is a *sufistic hijrah* where *hijrah* is not something that should be shown but hidden. In the end, the purpose of this *hijrah* is to become a religious human being socially, and this *hijrah* also forms a preference for political Islam in ideology.

The table 1, summarizes the three stages of *hijrah* and their meanings both socio-religious and socio-political.

Table 1: Stages and Indicators of *Hijrah* in the Muslim Middle Class

| <i>Hijrah</i> indicator | <i>Hijrah</i> Stages | | |
|-------------------------|--|--|---|
| | Cognitive Opening | Religious Seeking | Socialization |
| <i>Hijrah</i> meaning | <i>Hijrah</i> is interpreted only to be more religious in certain conditions and environment | <i>Hijrah</i> is interpreted as a form of deepening religious values as a solution to life | <i>Hijrah</i> is interpreted as an effort of personal expression regarding the importance of religion both privately and publicly |
| <i>Hijrah</i> goals | <i>Hijrah</i> aims as an effort to celebrate something in a religious way | <i>Hijrah</i> aims to balance the goals of worldly and <i>ukhrawi</i> life | <i>Hijrah</i> aims to emphasize that <i>ukhrawi</i> goals are more noble than worldly ones |
| Social interaction | <i>Hijrah</i> is an effort to build a safe and comfortable relationship | <i>Hijrah</i> is an effort to social demarcation between religious and non-religious matters | <i>Hijrah</i> is an effort to form a socio-religious enclave in a pluralistic society |

Source: Processed from various kinds of data

Referring to the explanation of the previous tabulation, *hijrah* will be more intensive when it has passed the stage of cognitive opening towards socialization. This intensive level can be assessed as the increasing religiousness of middle-class urban Muslims in prioritizing religion over worldly things. This intensive level can also be interpreted as the more expressive religious behavior of the Muslim middle class in the public sphere.

From these two explanations, *hijrah* then develops various vital implications that need to be noted, including 1) socio-culturally, *hijrah* has implications for the strengthening of Islamization in a society where everyone is competing to present themselves as a true Muslim; 2) socio-economically politically, *hijrah* has implications for the strengthening of political Islam as a voting preference and ideology. The interpretation of the goals of these two things only sometimes leads to an

Islamic state. However, Islam can be more accommodated in the political system; and 3) socio-economically, *hijrah* has implications for strengthening Sharia products as a lifestyle. This is in line with the principle of living free from usury and switching to adopting a halal lifestyle. These three implications have positive and negative impacts on the development of the middle-class Muslim community. The positive impact lies in strengthening the level of religiosity in society, which, if it impacts minimal acts of crime. At the same time, the negative impact on Islam is increasingly socially and politically exclusive.

Various kinds of studies examine the meaning of *hijrah* from various points of view. The variations of this point of view depend on the relationship between expressions of modernity and expressions of religiosity, and the need for appreciation and recognition. These two relations show the type and characteristics of the *hijrah* undertaken by the Muslim middle-class group. The two relations also show that socio-political tendencies are to be explained after the *hijrah* (Qomaruzzaman & Busro, 2021). Qomaruzzaman and Busro, for example, focus on the aspect of balance between modern and religious needs in musical expression. In the Islamic school of debate, this music is still considered a source of pros and cons. However, the *hijrah* community, members of the Qur'an Musicians Community (Komuji), try to display the humanist side of *hijrah* while trying not to change themselves completely but can still work and express themselves more religiously. The different narratives about *hijrah* are then shown by Afrida Muna, who shows differences regarding the meaning of *hijrah* in several celebrity hijabs. An interesting point made in her study is "accommodating protest", with a focus on the use of the hijab as an effort to accommodate the importance of religion in life as well as a form of protest against the public stigma that sneers at the glamor and private parts of female celebrities (Muna, 2021).

In contrast to the results of the two previous studies, subsequent studies on *hijrah* are more inclined to emphasize religiosity/*ukhrawi* rather than balancing worldly and *ukhrawi*. The tendency of political Islam is also tightening, especially because of intra-ideological rivalries between Islamic schools of thought. Middle-class Muslims experience an identity crisis due to the influence of rapid modernization. Other driving factors are economic inequality and social discrimination. This condition prompts the Muslim middle class to see *hijrah* as a means of "liberation".

For this reason, religious orientation is the primary preference, both socio-religious and socio-political. An example is *hijrah* which tends to be oriented towards becoming a Salafist or *hizbiyyin*. In other words, the purpose of his own *hijrah* already contains a more extensive agenda than his agenda. Other studies show that there is a reasonably complex link in *hijrah* by middle-class Muslim women. More specifically, there is a demand to be a devout Muslim woman by covering her genitals and solidarity with the importance of Islam in the public sphere, for example, by participating in various movements such as "Choosing Muslim Leaders", "414", and "212". The nuances of Islamism are pretty thick in the practice of *hijrah* experienced by middle-class Muslim women, where *aurat* and *dakwah* are keywords in explaining the orientation of *hijrah*, which tends to become the dominant actor in the public sphere.

The table below summarizes the understanding, orientation, and goals of the *hijrah* carried out by the Muslim middle class. The two key sentences in this table are 1) the more religious the migratory behavior is, the blacker and whiter it is in viewing social dynamics and 2) the looser the *hijrah* behavior, the more narcissistic the religious expression in the public sphere. Those two key sentences also become the fundamental analysis in looking at the tabulation below regarding *hijrah*, Table 2.

Table 2. Understanding, Goals, and Orientation of *Hijrah* among the Indonesian Muslim Middle Class

| <i>Hijrah</i> characteristics | <i>Hijrah</i> Understanding | <i>Hijrah</i> goals | <i>Hijrah</i> Orientation |
|-------------------------------|--|--|---|
| Narcissistic <i>Hijrah</i> | <i>Hijrah</i> as a means of social climbing in which to look religious and show worship activities is an effort to | <i>Hijrah</i> aims for social climbing where being more religious can get a positive | <i>Hijrah</i> is oriented towards the recognition and actualization of narcissism where |

| | | | |
|------------------------|---|--|--|
| | modern and <i>syar'i</i> adaptive existence | assessment socially and culturally | middle-class Muslims compete to be at the forefront of worship. |
| Dogmatic <i>Hijrah</i> | <i>Hijrah</i> as a form of deepening religious values in individuals who see the <i>ukhrawi</i> side is the ultimate goal | <i>Hijrah</i> aims to be <i>amar ma'ruf nahi munkar</i> with an advocative attitude towards mainstreaming Islam in the public sphere | <i>Hijrah</i> is oriented more towards fulfilling <i>ukhrawi</i> needs than worldly ones. |
| Sufistic <i>Hijrah</i> | <i>Hijrah</i> is a means of contemplation and self-improvement in the future based on religious values | <i>Hijrah</i> aims to present Islam that is <i>rahmatan lil alamin</i> by focusing on self-improvement with tolerance for other parties. | <i>Hijrah</i> is oriented towards personal self-improvement so that it can be accepted in an inclusive manner both in relation to fellow human beings and to God |

Source: Processed from various kinds of data

Table 2 shows that *hijrah* among the Muslim middle class has a variety of understandings, goals, and orientations. These show that *hijrah* is not monolithic, moving from harmful to good. The process of moving a middle-class Muslim to become a "better one" is covered by various factors, for example, the theological understanding of religion and the placement of religious practice in daily life. For the first reason, this theological understanding of religion then places the dimension of *hijrah* as a doctrinal path for middle-class Muslims in placing the goal of the afterlife as more critical. Meanwhile, on the second reason, the placement of this religious practice depends on how religion can become a new symbol of the existence of middle-class Muslims in their social relations.

CLOSING

The idea of *hijrah* initially was a personal redemption journey intending to get closer to God. This attitude ideally would make him/her a better person by committing more to religious values. By reducing wordy intention and improving prayer quality, Muslims wished to be pious and courteous. These original aims became a primary guideline for Muslims who committed to the *hijrah*.

Nowadays, there is a recent shift in understanding *hijrah*. Previously, it was a personal need, but it has been changed into the collective norm for Muslims. This happens due to the rise of Islamism in the public sphere. It makes people contest running for more Islamic values. More importantly, since the effect of

polarization remains imminent, it makes *hijrah* mandatory for Muslims.

This recent shift of *hijrah* that affected the Indonesian Muslim middle class became the main drive for the *hijrah* movement. However, rather than driven by political motives, it seems that *hijrah* is a way to negotiate between modernism and piousness. It becomes a new agenda for further research activities for those interested in that shift.

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